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Abstract
In this paper, we advocate the use of setwise contests for aggregating a set of input rankings
into an output ranking. We propose a generalization of the Kemeny rule where one minimizes
the number of k-wise disagreements instead of pairwise disagreements (one counts 1 disagree-
ment each time the top choice in a subset of alternatives of cardinality at most k differs between
an input ranking and the output ranking). After an algorithmic study of this k-wise Kemeny
aggregation problem, we introduce a k-wise counterpart of the majority graph. It reveals use-
ful to divide the aggregation problem into several sub-problems. We conclude with numerical
tests.
1 Introduction
Rank aggregation aims at producing a single ranking from a collection of rankings of a fixed set
of alternatives. In social choice theory (e.g., Moulin 1991), where the alternatives are candidates
to an election and each ranking represents the preferences of a voter, aggregation rules are called
Social Welfare Functions (SWFs). Apart from social choice, rank aggregation has proved useful in
many applications, including preference learning (Cheng and Hu¨llermeier, 2009; Cle´menc¸on et al.,
2018), collaborative filtering (Wang et al., 2014), genetic map creation (Jackson et al., 2008),
similarity search in databases systems (Fagin et al., 2003) and design of web search engines
(Altman and Tennenholtz, 2008; Dwork et al., 2001). In the following, we use interchangeably
the terms “input rankings” and “preferences”, “output ranking” and “consensus ranking”, as well
as “alternatives” and “‘candidates”.
The well-known Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that there exists no aggregation rule
satisfying a small set of desirable properties (Arrow, 1950). In the absense of an “ideal” rule,
various aggregation rules have been proposed and studied. Following Fishburn’s classification
(1977), we can distinguish between the SWFs for which the output ranking can be computed
from the majority graph alone, those for which the output ranking can be computed from the
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Table 1: Results of setwise contests in Example 1.
set c1 c2 c3
{c1, c2} 49 51 –
{c1, c3} 49 – 51
{c2, c3} – 52 48
{c1, c2, c3} 49 3 48
weighted majority graph alone, and all other SWFs1. The majority graph is obtained from the
input rankings by defining one vertex per alternative c and by adding an edge from c to c′ if c is
preferred to c′ in a strict majority of input rankings. In the weighted majority graph, each edge is
weighted by the majority margin. The many SWFs that rely on these graphs alone take therefore
only pairwise comparisons into account to determine an output ranking. For a compendium of
these SWFs, the interested reader may refer for instance to the book by Brandt et al. (2016).
The importance of this class of SWFs in social choice theory can be explained by their con-
nection with the Condorcet consistency property. This property states that, if there is a Con-
dorcet winner (i.e., an alternative with outgoing edges to every other alternatives in the majority
graph), then it should be ranked first in the output ranking. Nevertheless, as shown for instance
by Baldiga and Green (2013), the lack of Condorcet consistency is not necessarily a bad thing,
because this property may come into contradiction with the objective of maximizing voters’ agree-
ment with the output ranking. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 1 (Baldiga and Green, 2013). Consider an election with 100 voters and 3 candidates
c1, c2, c3, where 49 voters have preferences c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3, 48 have preferences c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 and 3
have preferences c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1. Candidate c2 defeats every other candidate in the strict pairwise
majority sense (Condorcet winner), but c2 is the top choice of only 3 voters. In contrast, candidate
c1 is in slight minority against c2 and c3, but c1 is the top choice of 49 voters. This massive gain
in agreement may justify to put c1 instead of c2 in first position of the output ranking.
Following Baldiga and Green (2013), we propose to handle this tension between the pairwise
comparisons (leading to ranking c2 first) and the plurality choice (leading to ranking c1 first) by
using SWFs that take into account not only pairwise comparisons but setwise contests. More
precisely, given input rankings on a set C of candidates and k ∈ {2, . . . , |C|}, the idea is to
consider the plurality score of each candidate c for each subset S⊆C such that 2≤|S|≤k, where
the plurality score of c for S is the number of voters for which c is the top choice in S. The results
of setwise contests for the preferences of Example 1 are given in Table 1 for k = 3. Note that
the three top rows obviously encode the same information as the weighted majority graph while
the bottom row makes it possible to detect the tension between the pairwise comparisons and the
plurality choice.
One can then define a new class of SWFs, those that rely on the results of setwise contests
alone to determine an output ranking. The many works that have been carried out regarding
voting rules based on the (weighted) majority graph can be revisited in this broader setting.
1 Fishburn’s classification actually applies to social choice functions, which prescribe a subset of winning alter-
natives from a collection of rankings, but the extension to SWFs is straightforward.
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This line of research has already been investigated by Lu and Boutilier 2010 and Baldiga and
Green 2013. However, note that both of these works consider a setting where candidates may
become unavailable after voters express their preferences. We do not make this assumption. We
indeed believe that this new class of SWFs makes sense in the standard setting where the set of
candidates is known and deterministic, as it amounts to generate an output ranking by examining
the choices that are made by the voters on subsets of candidates of various sizes (while usually
only pairwise choices are considered).
An SWF that seem natural in this class consists in determining an output ranking that min-
imizes the number of disagreements with the results of setwise contests for sets of cardinality at
most k. This is a k-wise generalization of the Kemeny rule, which is obtained as a special case for
k=2. We recall that the Kemeny rule consists in producing a ranking that minimizes the number
of pairwise disagreements (Kemeny, 1959).
Example 2. Let us come back to Example 1 and assume that we use the 3-wise Kemeny rule.
Consider the output ranking r = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3. For set S = {c1, c2}, the number of disagreements
with the results of setwise contests is 51 because c2 is the top choice in S for 51 voters (see
Table 1) while it is c1 for r. Similarly, the number of disagreements induced by {c1, c3}, {c2, c3}
and {c1, c2, c3} are respectively 51, 48 and 3+48. The total number of disagreements is thus
51+51+48+3+48 = 201. This is actually the minimum number of disagreements that can be
achieved for these input rankings, which makes r the k-wise Kemeny ranking.
The purpose of this paper is to study the k-wise Kemeny aggregation problem. Section 2
formally defines the problem and reports on related work. Section 3 is devoted to some axiomatic
considerations of the corresponding voting rule, and to an algorithmic study of the problem. We
then investigate a k-wise variant of the majority graph in Section 4. We prove that determining
this graph is easy for k = 3 but becomes NP-hard for k > 3, and we show how to use it in
a preprocessing step to speed up the computation of the output ranking. Numerical tests are
presented in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Adopting the terminology of social choice theory, we consider an election with a set V of n voters
and a set C of m candidates. Each voter v has a complete and transitive preference order rv over
candidates (also called ranking). The collection of these rankings defines a preference profile P.
2.1 Notations and Definitions
Let us introduce some notations related to rankings. We denote by R(C) the set of m! rankings
over C. Given a ranking r and two candidates c and c′, we write c ≻r c′ if c is in a higher position
than c′ in r. Given a ranking r and a candidate c, rk(c, r) denotes the rank of c in r. For instance,
rk(c, rv) = 1 if c is the preferred candidate of voter v (the candidate ranked highest in rv). Given
a ranking r and a set S ⊆ C, we define rS as the restriction of r to S and tr(S) as the top choice
(i.e., preferred candidate) in S according to r. Similarly, given a preference profile P and a set
S ⊆ C, we define PS as the restriction of P to S. Lastly, we denote by tailk(r) (resp. headk(r))
the subranking compounded of the k least (resp. most) preferred candidates in r.
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We are interested in SWFs which, given a preference profile P , should return a consensus
ranking which yields a suitable compromise between the preferences in P. One of the most well-
known SWFs is the Kemeny rule, which selects a ranking r with minimal Kendall tau distance
to P . Denoting by δKT(r, r′) the Kendall tau distance between rankings r and r′, the distance
δKT(r,P) between a ranking r and a profile P reads as:
δKT(r,P) =
∑
r′∈P
δKT(r, r
′)
where δKT(r, r
′) =
∑
{c,c′}⊆C
1tr({c,c′})6=tr′ ({c,c
′})
Stated differently, δKT measures the distance between two rankings by the number of pairwise
disagreements between them. The distance between a ranking and a preference profile is then
obtained by summation.
However, the Kendall tau distance only takes into account pairwise comparisons, which may
entail counterintuitive results as illustrated by Example 1. To address this issue, the Kendall tau
distance can be generalized to take into consideration disagreements on sets of cardinal greater
than two. Given a set S ⊆ C and t ≤ m, we denote by ∆t(S) the set of subsets of S of cardinal
lower than or equal to t, i.e., ∆t(S)={S′ ⊆ S s.t. |S′| ≤ t}. When S is not specified, it is assumed
to be C, i.e., ∆t=∆t(C). For k≥2, the k-wise Kendall tau distance δkKT between r and r′ is defined
by:
δkKT(r, r
′) =
∑
S∈∆k
1tr(S)6=tr′ (S)
In other words, δkKT measures the distance between two rankings by the number of top-choice
disagreements on sets of cardinal lower than or equal to k.
Note that δkKT has all the properties of a distance: non-negativity, identity of indiscernibles,
symmetry and triangle inequality (see Proposition 2 in Appendix A). Secondly, as mentioned in
the introduction, we have δ2KT= δKT. Thirdly and maybe most importantly, we point out that the
distances induced by δkKT(r, r
′) can be computed in O(m3) by using the following formula:
δkKT(r, r
′) =
∑
{c,c′}⊆C
1c≻rc′1c′≻r′c
|∆k−2(Bc(r) ∩Bc′(r′))|
=
∑
{c,c′}⊆C
1c≻rc′1c′≻r′c
k−2∑
i=0
(|Bc(r) ∩Bc′(r′)|
i
)
(1)
where Bc(r) = {x ∈ C s.t. c ≻r x} is the set of candidates that are ranked below c in r. Let us
give some intuition for this formula (see Proposition 3 in Appendix A for a proof of the O(m3)
complexity). For any pair {c, c′} of candidates such that c ≻r c′ and c′ ≻r′ c, we count the number
of sets in ∆k on which there is a disagreement because the top choice is c for r while it is c′ for r′.
Such sets are of the form S ∪ {c, c′}, where S ∈ ∆k−2(Bc(r) ∩ Bc′(r′)), otherwise c and c′ would
not be the top choices. Hence the formula.
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The distance δkKT induces a new SWF, the k-wise Kemeny rule, which, given a profile P , returns
a ranking r with minimal distance δkKT to P, where:
δkKT(r,P) =
∑
r′∈P
δkKT(r, r
′)
Note that this coincides with the rule we used in the introduction, by commutativity of addi-
tion: ∑
r′∈P
∑
S∈∆k
1tr(S)6=tr′ (S)
=
∑
S∈∆k
∑
r′∈P
1tr(S)6=tr′ (S)
Determining a consensus ranking for this rule defines the k-KAP optimization problem (for
k-wise Kemeny Aggregation Problem).
k-WISE KEMENY AGGREGATION PROBLEM
INSTANCE: A profile P with n voters and m candidates.
SOLUTION: A ranking r of the m candidates.
MEASURE: δkKT(r,P) to minimize.
2.2 Related Work
Several other variants of the Kemeny rule have been proposed in the literature, either to obtain gen-
eralizations able to deal with partial or weak orders (Dwork et al., 2001; Zwicker, 2018), to penalize
more some pairwise disagreements than others (Kumar and Vassilvitskii, 2010), or to account for
candidates that may become unavailable after voters express their preferences (Baldiga and Green,
2013; Lu and Boutilier, 2010).
Indeed, despite its popularity, the Kemeny rule has received several criticisms. One of them is
that the Kendall tau distance counts equally the disagreements on every pair of candidates. This
property is undesirable in many settings. For instance, with a web search engine, a disagreement
on a pair of web pages with high positions in the considered rankings should have a higher cost than
a disagreement on pairs of web pages with lower ones. This drawback motivated the introduction
of weighted Kendall tau distances by Kumar and Vassilvitskii 2010. We compare our work to
theirs in Appendix B and show that the k-wise Kendall tau distance is also well suited to penalize
more the disagreements involving alternatives at the top of the input rankings, as illustrated by
the following example.
Example 3. Consider rankings r1, r2, r3 defined by c1 ≻r1 c2 ≻r1 c3, c1 ≻r2 c3 ≻r2 c2, and c2 ≻r3
c1≻r3 c3. We have δKT(r1, r2)=δKT(r1, r3)=1 while δ3KT(r1, r2)=1<2=δ3KT(r1, r3) because r1 and r3
disagree on both subsets {c1, c2} and {c1, c2, c3}. Put another way, δ3KT(r1, r3) > δ3KT(r1, r2) because
r1 and r3 disagree on their top-ranked alternatives whereas r1 and r2 disagree on the alternatives
ranked in the last places.
The two works closest to ours are related to another extension of the Kemeny rule. This
extension considers a setting in which, besides the fact that voters have preferences over a set C,
the election will in fact occur on a subset S ⊆ C drawn according to a probability distribution
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(Baldiga and Green, 2013; Lu and Boutilier, 2010). The optimization problem considered is then
to find a consensus ranking r which minimizes, in expectation, the number of voters’ disagreements
with the chosen candidate in S (a voter v disagrees if trv(S) 6= tr(S)). The differences between the
work of Baldiga and Green 2013 and the one of Lu and Boutilier 2010 is then twofold. Firstly,
while Baldiga and Green mostly focused on the axiomatic properties of this aggregation procedure,
the work of Lu and Boutilier has more of an algorithmic flavor. Secondly, while Baldiga and Green
mostly study a setting in which the probability P(S) of S is only dependent on its cardinality (i.e.,
P(S) is only a function of |S|), Lu and Boutilier study a setting that can be viewed as a special case
of the former, where each candidate is absent of S independently of the others with a probability
p (i.e., P(S) = p|C\S|(1 − p)|S|). The Kemeny aggregation problem can be formulated in both
settings, either by defining P(S)=0 for |S|≥3, or by defining a probability p that is “sufficiently
high” w.r.t. the size of the instance (Lu and Boutilier, 2010). Lu and Boutilier conjectured that
the determination of a consensus ranking is NP-hard in their setting, designed an exact method
based on mathematical programming, two approximation greedy algorithms and a PTAS.
Our model can be seen as a special case of the model of Baldiga and Green where the set S is
drawn uniformly at random within the set of subsets of C of cardinal smaller than or equal to a
given constant k≥2. While it cannot be casted in the specific setting studied by Lu and Boutilier,
our model is closely related and may be used to obtain new insights on their work.
3 Aggregation with the k-wise Kemeny Rule
In this section, we investigate the axiomatic properties of the k-wise Kemeny rule, and then we
turn to the algorithmic study of k-KAP.
3.1 Axiomatic Properties of the k-wise Kemeny Rule
Several properties of the k-wise Kemeny rule have already been studied by Baldiga and Green
2013, because their setting includes the k-wise Kemeny rule as a special case. Among other things,
they showed that the rule is not Condorcet consistent. That is to say, a Condorcet winner may
not be ranked first in any consensus ranking even when one exists, as illustrated by Example 2.
The authors also show that the k-wise Kemeny rule is neutral, i.e., all candidates are treated
equally, and that for k ≥ 3 it is different from any positional method or any method that uses
only the pairwise majority margins (among which is the standard Kemeny rule). We provide here
some additional properties satisfied by the k-wise Kemeny rule:
• Monotonicity : up-ranking cannot harm a winner; down-ranking cannot enable a loser to
win.
• Unanimity : if all voters rank c before c′, then c is ranked before c′ in any consensus ranking.
• Reinforcement : let R∗P and R∗P ′ denote the sets of consensus rankings for preference profiles
P and P ′ respectively. If R∗P ∩R∗P ′ 6= ∅ and P ′′ is the profile obtained by concatenating P
and P ′, then R∗P ′′ = R∗P ∩R∗P′ .
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While the fact that the k-wise Kemeny rule satisfies reinforcement is quite obvious from its defi-
nition, the monotonicity and unanimity conditions are proved in Appendix C (see Propositions 5
and 6).
Besides, the k-wise Kemeny rule does not satisfy Independence of irrelevant alternatives, i.e.,
the relative positions of two candidates in a consensus ranking can depend on the presence of
other candidates. Let us illustrate this point with the following example.
Example 4. Considering the preference profile from Example 1, the only consensus ranking for
δ3KT is c1≻c2≻c3. Yet, without c3 the only consensus ranking would be c2≻c1.
Lastly, note that there exists a noise model such that the k-wise Kemeny rule can be interpreted
as a maximum likelihood estimator (Conitzer et al., 2009). In this view of voting, one assumes that
there exists a “correct” ranking r, and each vote corresponds to a noisy perception of this correct
ranking. Consider the conditional probability measure P on R(C) defined by P(r′|r)∝ e−δkKT(r,r′).
It is easy to convince oneself that the k-wise Kemeny rule returns a ranking r∗ that maximizes
P(P |r∗)=∏r′∈P P(r′|r∗) and is thus a maximum likelihood estimate of r.
3.2 Computational Complexity of k-KAP
We now turn to the algorithmic study of k-KAP. After providing a hardness result, we will design
an efficient Fixed Parameter Tractable (FPT) algorithm for parameter m.
While k-KAP is obviously NP-hard for k=2 as it then corresponds to determining a consensus
ranking w.r.t. the Kemeny rule, we strengthen this result by showing that it is also NP-hard for
any constant value k ≥ 3. The proof, which is deferred to Appendix C, uses a reduction from
2-KAP.
Theorem 1. For any constant k ≥ 3, k-KAP is NP-hard, even if the number of voters equals
4 or if the average range of candidates equals 2 (where the range of a candidate c is defined by
maxr∈P rk(c, r)−minr∈P rk(c, r) + 1 and the average is taken over all candidates).
Despite this result, k-KAP is obviously FPT w.r.t. the number m of candidates, by sim-
ply trying the m! rankings in R(C). We now design a dynamic programming procedure which
significantly improves this time complexity.
Proposition 1. If r∗ is an optimal ranking for k-KAP, then δkKT(r
∗,P)=dkKT(C), where, for any
subset S ⊆ C, dkKT(S) is defined by the recursive relation:
dkKT(S) = min
c∈S
[dkKT(S \ {c})
+
∑
r∈PS
∑
c′≻rc
k−2∑
i=0
(|S| − rk(c′, r)− 1
i
)
] (2)
dkKT(∅) = 0.
Proof. Given S ⊆C and c ∈ S, let us define Rc(S) as {r ∈R(S) s.t. tr(S) = c}. The set ∆k(S)
can be partitioned into ∆kc (S)={S′ ⊆ ∆k(S) s.t. c ∈ S′} and ∆kc (S)={S′ ⊆ ∆k(S) s.t. c 6∈ S′}=
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∆k(S \{c}). Given a preference profile P over C and a ranking rˆ∈Rc(S), the summation defining
δkKT(rˆ,PS) breaks down as follows:
δkKT(rˆ,PS) =
∑
r∈PS
∑
S′∈∆k(S)
1trˆ(S′)6=tr(S′)
= δkKT(rˆS\{c},PS\{c}) +
∑
r∈PS
∑
S′∈∆kc (S)
1trˆ(S′)6=tr(S′). (3)
Using the same reasoning as in Equation 1 on page 4, the second summand in Equation 3 can be
rewritten as follows: ∑
r∈PS
∑
c′∈S
1c′≻rc
k−2∑
i=0
(|Bc(rˆ) ∩Bc′(r)|
i
)
because trˆ(S
′)=c for all S′∈∆kc (S). Note that Bc(rˆ)=S\{c} and Bc′(r)={c′′∈S s.t. c′≻r c′′} ⊆S,
thus |Bc(rˆ) ∩Bc′(r)|= |S| − rk(c′, r)− 1. Hence δkKT(rˆ,PS) is equal to:
δkKT(rˆS\{c},PS\{c}) +
∑
r∈PS
∑
c′≻rc
k−2∑
i=0
(|S| − rk(c′, r)− 1
i
)
(4)
Consider now a ranking r∗ ∈ R(S) such that δkKT(r∗,PS) = minr∈R(S) δkKT(r,PS). We have:
δkKT(r
∗,PS) = min
c∈S
min
rˆ∈Rc(S)
δkKT(rˆ,PS)
= min
c∈S
(
( min
rˆ∈R(S\{c})
δkKT(rˆ,PS\{c}))
+
∑
r∈PS
∑
c′≻rc
k−2∑
i=0
(|S| − rk(c′, r)− 1
i
))
because the second summand in Equation 4 does not depend on rˆ (it only depends on c, which is
the argument of the min). If one denotes minr∈R(S) δ
k
KT(r,PS) by dkKT(S), one obtains Equation 2.
This concludes the proof.
A candidate c∈S that realizes the minimum in Equation 2 can be ranked in first position in
an optimal ranking for PS . Once dkKT(S) is computed for each S⊆C, a ranking r∗ achieving the
optimal value dkKT(C) can thus be determined recursively starting from S=C. The complexity of
the induced dynamic programming method is O(2mm2n) because there are 2m subsets S ⊆ C to
consider and each value dkKT(S) is computed in O(m
2n) by Equation 2. The min operation is indeed
performed on m values and the sum
∑
c′≻rc
∑k−2
i=0
(|S|−rk(c′,r)−1
i
)
can be computed incrementally
in O(m), which entails an O(mn) complexity for the second summand in Equation 2 (the n factor
is of course due to the sum over all r∈PS). Note that the computation of all binomial coefficients(
p
i
)
for i∈{0, . . . , k − 2} and p∈{i, . . . ,m− 2} can be performed in O(mk) in a preliminary step
thanks to Pascal’s formula.
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4 The k-Wise Majority Digraph
We now propose and investigate a k-wise counterpart of the pairwise majority digraph, that will
be used in a preprocessing procedure for k-KAP.
As stated in the introduction, the pairwise Kemeny rule is strongly related to the pairwise
majority digraph. We denote by GP the pairwise majority digraph associated to profile P. We
recall that in this digraph, there is one vertex per candidate, and there is an arc from candidate
c to candidate c′ if a strict majority of voters prefers c to c′. In the weighted pairwise majority
digraph, each arc (c, c′) is weighted by wP(c, c
′) := |{r ∈ P s.t. c ≻r c′}| − |{r ∈ P s.t. c′ ≻r c}|.
Example 5. Consider a profile P with 10 voters and 6 candidates such that:
– 4 voters have preferences c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c5 ≻ c6;
– 4 voters have preferences c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6;
– 1 voter has preferences c6 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c5;
– 1 voter has preferences c6 ≻ c1 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c5.
The pairwise majority digraph GP is represented on the left of Figure 1.
c1
c2c3
c4
c5 c6
c1
c2c3
c4
c5 c6
Figure 1: k-wise majority digraph in Example 5 for k = 2 (left) and k = 3 (right).
From GP , we can define a set of consistent rankings:
Definition 1. Consider a digraph G whose vertices correspond to the candidates in C. Let
B1(G), . . . , Bt(G)(G) denote the subsets of C corresponding to the Strongly Connected Components
(SCCs) of G, and O(G) denote the set of linear orders <G on {1, . . . , t(G)} such that if there exists
an arc (c, c′) from c∈Bi(G) to c′ ∈Bj(G) then i<G j. Given <G∈O(G), we say that a ranking r
is consistent with <G if the candidates in Bi are ranked before the ones of Bj when i <G j.
The following result states that, for any <GP∈O(GP), there exists a consensus ranking for δKT
among the rankings consistent with <GP .
Theorem 2 (Theorem 16 in reference Charon and Hudry, 2010). Let P be a profile over C and
assume that the SCCs of GP are numbered according to a linear order <GP∈O(GP). Consider the
ranking r∗, consistent with <GP , obtained by the concatenation of rankings r
∗
1, . . . , r
∗
t(GP )
where
δKT(r
∗
i ,PBi(GP ))=minr∈R(Bi(GP )) δKT(r,PBi(GP )). We have:
δKT(r
∗,P)= min
r∈R(C)
δKT(r,P)
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That is, r∗ is a consensus ranking according to the Kemeny rule. Furthermore, if O(GP) = {<GP}
and wP (c, c
′) > 0 for all c ∈ Bi(GP) and c′ ∈ Bj(GP) when i <GP j, then all consensus rankings
are consistent with <GP .
This result does not hold anymore if one uses δkKT (with k≥3) instead of δKT, as shown by the
following example.
Example 6. Let us denote by P the profile of Example 1. The pairwise majority digraph GP has
three SCCs B1(GP) = {c2}, B2(GP) = {c3} and B3(GP) = {c1}. In this example, O(GP ) = {<GP}
where 1 <GP 2 <GP 3. The only ranking consistent with <GP is c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 while the only
consensus ranking w.r.t. the 3-wise Kemeny rule is c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3.
In order to adapt Theorem 2 to the k-wise Kemeny rule, we now introduce the concept of
k-wise majority digraph. Let ∆kcc′(S)={S′ ∈∆k(S) s.t. {c, c′} ⊆ S′}. If S is not specified, it is
assumed to be C. Given a ranking r, we denote by ∆kr(S, c, c
′) the set {S′∈∆kcc′(S) s.t. tr(S′)=c}.
Given a profile P , we denote by φkP (S, c, c′) the value
∑
r∈P |∆kr (S, c, c′)| and by wkP (S, c, c′) the
difference φkP(S, c, c
′)−φkP (S, c′, c). This definition implies that wkP(S, c′, c)=−wkP (S, c, c′). The
value wkP (S, c, c
′) is the net agreement loss that would be incurred by swapping c and c′ in a
feasible solution r of k-KAP where rk(c′, r)=rk(c, r)+1 and S=Bc′(r)∪{c, c′}. If maxS∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′)≥0 (resp. minS∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′)>0) then, in a consensus ranking r for δkKT where c and
c′ would be consecutive, it is possible (resp. necessary) that c ≻r c′.
The k-wise majority digraph associated to a profile P over a set C of candidates is the weighted
digraph GkP=(V,A), where V=C and (c, c′)∈A iff:
∃S ∈ ∆mcc′ s.t. wkP(S, c, c′) > 0.
The weight wkP(c, c
′) of this arc is then given by:
wkP(c, c
′) := max
S∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′).
Note that, if k ≥ 3, we may obtain edges (c, c′) and (c′, c) both with strictly positive weights (which
is impossible in the pairwise majority digraph). For instance, for the profile P of Example 5,
wkP(c3, c4)=w
k
P ({c2, c3, c4}, c3, c4)=1 and wkP (c4, c3)=wkP({c3, c4, c5}, c4, c3)=4. The digraph G3P
is shown on the right of Figure 1. Besides, for any P , G2P is the pairwise majority digraph as
∆2cc′(S)={{c, c′}} ∀S∈∆mcc′ . Theorem 2 adapts as follows for an arbitrary k (the proof is deferred
to Appendix D):
Theorem 3. Let P be a profile over C and assume that the SCCs of GkP are numbered according
to a linear order <Gk
P
∈O(GkP). Among the rankings consistent with <GkP , there exists a consensus
ranking w.r.t. the k-wise Kemeny rule. Besides, if O(GkP)={<Gk
P
} and minS∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′)>02
for all c∈Bi(GkP) and c′ ∈Bj(GkP ) when i <GkP j, then all consensus rankings are consistent with
<Gk
P
.
Example 7. The meta-graph of SCCs of G3P in Example 5 is represented in Figure 2. The
above result implies that there exists a consensus ranking among c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6,
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c6 ≻ c5, c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 and c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c6 ≻ c5.
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B1 = {c1} B2 = {c2} B3 = {c3, c4} B4 = {c5, c6}
Figure 2: The meta-graph of strongly connected components of G3P in Example 5.
To take advantage of Theorem 3, one could try 1) to index the SCCs of GkP according to a
linear order <Gk
P
∈ O(GkP), and then 2) to work on each SCC separately, before concatenating the
obtained rankings. However, for a consensus ranking consistent with <Gk
P
, the relative positions
of candidates in Bi(GkP) depend on the set of candidates in B>i(GkP) :=Bi+1(GkP)∪ . . .∪Bt(GkP )(G
k
P)
(but not on their order). The influence of B>i(GkP) can be captured in the dynamic programming
procedure by applying a modified version of Equation 2 separately for each subset Bt(Gk
P
)(GkP)
downto B1(GkP). Formally, if r∗ is optimal for k-KAP, then:
δkKT(r
∗,P)=
t(Gk
P
)∑
i=1
dkKT(Bi(GkP ))
where, for any subset S ⊆ Bi(GkP), dkKT(S) is defined by dkKT(∅) = 0 and (B>i stands for B>i(GkP )):
dkKT(S) = min
c∈S
[dkKT(S\{c})
+
∑
r∈PS∪B>i
∑
c′≻rc
k−2∑
i=0
(|S|+ |B>i| − rk(c′, r)− 1
i
)
]
It amounts to replacing S by S∪B>i in the second summand of Equation 2 to take into account the
fact that there exists a consensus ranking where all the candidates of B>i are ranked after those of
Bi. Let r
∗
i be a ranking of Bi(GkP ) such that δkKT(r∗≥i,PB≥i(GkP ))=d
k
KT(Bi(GkP))+. . .+dkKT(Bt(Gk)(GkP )),
where r∗≥i is the ranking obtained by the concatenation of rankings r
∗
i , . . . , r
∗
t(Gk)
in this order. The
ranking r∗≥1 of C is a consensus ranking w.r.t. the k-wise Kemeny rule. Given Theorem 3, the
k-wise majority digraph thus seems like a promising tool to boost the computation of a consensus
ranking. Unfortunately, the following negative result holds, whose proof is deferred to Appendix
D.
Theorem 4. Given a profile P and two candidates c and c′, determining if maxS∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′) >
0 is NP-hard for k ≥ 4.
Consequently, computing the digraph GkP from P is NP-hard for k ≥ 4. In contrast, the di-
graph G3P can be computed in polynomial time. Indeed, given a set S ⊂C such that {c, c′}⊆S,
adding an element x∈C\S to S increases φ3P (S, c, c′) by one for each r∈P such that c≻r c′ and
c≻r x. Let us denote by Pc≻c′ the set {r ∈ P s.t. c≻r c′}. A set S∗ maximizing w3P(S, c, c′) is
S∗ :={c, c′} ∪ {x ∈ C s.t. | Pc≻c′ ∩Pc≻x |> | Pc′≻c ∩Pc′≻x |}.
2Or, equivalently, maxS∈∆m
cc
′
wkP(S, c
′, c)<0.
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Note that one can take advantage of the meta-graph of SCCs to trim the graph GkP if one
looks for a consensus ranking r∗ consistent with a specific order <Gk
P
∈ O(GkP). It may indeed
happen that, for an edge (c, c′), the weight wkP(c, c
′)=wkP(S, c, c
′)>0 corresponds to a set S which
contains candidates that will never be below c in r∗. Conversely, the set S may omit candidates
that are necessarily below c in r∗. These constraints can be induced by either unanimity dominance
relations or by <Gk
P
. The following example illustrates this idea.
Example 8. Let us refine the digraph G3P previously obtained for the profile P of Example 5.
The SCCs are B1 = {c1}, B2 = {c2}, B3 = {c3, c4} and B4 = {c5, c6} and O(GkP ) = {<Gk
P
},
where 1 <Gk
P
2 <Gk
P
3 <Gk
P
4. A set maximizing w3P(S, c3, c4) is S={c2, c3, c4}. This set contains
c2 while it is necessarily above c3 in a consistent ranking. Conversely, candidates c5 and c6 are
omitted while they are necessarily below c3. By taking into account these constraints, we obtain
that a set maximizing w3P(S, c3, c4) is S={c3, c4, c5, c6}, for which w3P(S, c3, c4)=−4. Hence, we
can remove the arc (c3, c4) from G3P . Similarly, it is possible to show that the arc (c6, c5) can be
removed from G3P . Thanks to these refinement steps, we can conclude that a consensus ranking is
r∗ = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c5 ≻ c6.
5 Numerical Tests
Our numerical tests3 have three objectives: we evaluate the computational performance of the
dynamic programming approach of Section 3, we evaluate the impact of parameter k on the set
of consensus rankings, and we assess the efficiency of the preprocessing technique of Section 4.
Generation of preference profiles. The preference profiles are generated according to the Mal-
lows model (Mallows, 1957), using the Python package PrefLib-Tools (Mattei and Walsh, 2013).
This model takes two parameters as input: a reference ranking σ (the mode of the distribution)
and a dispersion parameter φ ∈ (0, 1). Given these inputs, the probability of generating a ranking
r is proportional to φδKT(r,σ). The more φ tends towards 0 (resp. 1), the more the preference
rankings become correlated and resemble σ (resp. become equally probable, i.e., we are close to
the impartial culture assumption). This model makes it possible to measure in an efficient and
simple way how the level of correlation in the input rankings impacts our results. In all tests,
the number n of voters is set to 50 and the ranking σ is set arbitrarily as the k-wise Kemeny
rule is neutral. For each triple (m,k, φ) considered, the results are averaged over 50 instances of
preference profiles.
Practicability of the dynamic programming approach. We first evaluate our dynamic
programming approach on instances with different values for parameters m and k. Note that the
computational performance measured here is not impacted by the level of correlation in the input
rankings as it does not change the number of states in the dynamic programming algorithm nor
the computation time to determine the optimal value in each of these states. Hence, we only
consider instances generated under the impartial culture assumption, i.e., with φ ≈ 1.
3Implementation in C++. Times are wall-clocked on a machine with an Intel Core I7-8700 3.20 GHz processor
and 16GB of RAM.
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Table 2: Average, max and min running times in seconds of the dynamic programming approach
of Section 3 for varying values of m and k (Rows 3 to 5). Average number of consensus rankings
for increasing values of k and m (Row 6).
m 6 10 14 18
k 2 3 6 2 5 10 2 7 14 2 9 18
Average time <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.07 0.08 0.08 2.52 2.55 2.61 71.16 72.87 75.07
Max time <0.01 <0,01 <0,01 0.8 0.08 0.09 2.64 2.60 2.65 71.57 73.57 75.93
Min time <0,01 <0,01 <0,01 0.7 0.07 0.08 2.49 2.50 2.57 70.96 72.52 74.75
|R∗|avg 3.00 1.20 1.05 3.84 1.24 1.10 5.36 2.36 1.16 19.7 4.12 1.47
Table 2 (Rows 3-5) displays the average, max and min running times obtained for some repre-
sentative (m,k) values. As expected, the running times increase exponentially withm. Conversely,
parameter k seems to have a moderate impact on the running times. The dynamic programming
approach enables us to solve k-KAP in a time of up to 3 sec. (resp. 76 sec.) for m≤ 14 (resp.
m≤18).
Influence of k on the set of consensus rankings. Second, we study the impact of parameter
k on the set of optimal solutions to k-KAP. Indeed, one criticism for the Kemeny rule is that
there exists instances for which the set of consensus rankings is compounded of many solutions
which are quite different from one another. Thus, we investigate if increasing the value of k helps
in mitigating this issue. For this purpose, we consider the same instances as before and compute
the average number of consensus rankings.
The results are displayed in the sixth row of Table 2, where the average number of consensus
rankings is denoted by |R∗|avg. Interestingly, we observe that this measure decreases quickly with
k. For instance, when m=18, |R∗|avg is divided by 5 when k increases from 2 to 9 and is below 2
when k=m. The intuition is that the distance δkKT becomes more fine grained as k increases.
Impact of the 3-wise majority graph. Lastly, we study the impact of the preprocessing
method proposed in Section 4 for k=3. This preprocessing uses the k-wise majority digraph to
divide k-KAP into several subproblems which can be solved separately by dynamic programming.
Hopefully, when voters’ preferences are correlated (i.e., for “small” φ values), these subproblems
become smaller and more numerous, making the preprocessing more efficient.
The results are shown in Table 3, where the results obtained without preprocessing are also
given in the last column. We observe that the running times are highly dependent on the value
of φ. For instance, with m=18, the average running time for solving 3-KAP is above 1 minute
if φ=0.95 while it is below 1 second if φ≤ 0.85. Note that this gap is necessarily related to the
preprocessing step, since, as already stated, parameter φ has no impact on the running time of
the dynamic programming approach. To explain this significant speed-up, we display in Table 4
the average size of the largest SCC of the 3-wise majority digraph at the end of the preprocessing
step. Unsurprisingly, this average size turns out to be correlated with φ. Indeed, when φ≤ 0.5,
the size of the largest SCC is almost always 1. Hence, the preprocessing step is likely to yield
directly a consensus ranking. In contrast, when φ=0.95, the average size of the largest SCC is
close to m, thus the impact of the preprocessing is low.
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Table 3: Average, max and min running times (in seconds) for the 3-wise Kemeny rule with
preprocessing.
m φ 0.5 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
w/o
preproc.
Avg time <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
6 Max time <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Min time <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Avg time 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.07
10 Max time 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.08
Min time 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07
Avg time 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.94 2.21 2.52
14 Max time 0.09 0.13 0.25 3.15 3.26 2.59
Min time 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.26 2.49
Avg time 0.20 0.20 0.55 14.9 61.9 71.32
18 Max time 0.31 0.21 8.48 80.09 80.42 71.81
Min time 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.22 6.02 71.26
Table 4: Average size of the largest SCC after preprocessing.
m\φ 0.47 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.95
6 <1.1 1.84 1.88 2.72 3.28
10 <1.1 1.64 3.28 5.32 8.20
14 <1.1 2.68 3.84 9.12 12.91
18 <1.1 2.84 4.27 9.80 17.44
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we advocate using the results of setwise contests between candidates to design
social welfare functions that are less myopic than those only based on pairwise comparisons.
In this direction, we have studied a k-wise generalization of the Kemeny rule, and established
that determining a consensus ranking is NP-hard for any k ≥ 3. After proposing a dynamic
programming procedure, we have investigated a k-wise variant of the majority graph, from which
we developed a preprocessing step. Computing this graph is a polynomial time problem for k=3
but becomes NP-hard for k≥ 4. The numerical tests show the practicability of the approach for
up to 18 candidates. A natural research direction is to investigate the complexity of determining a
consensus ranking for δkKT when k=m, because our hardness result only holds for fixed values of k.
Another avenue to explore is to propose alternative definitions of k-wise majority graphs that are
easier to calculate for k>3. Finally, other social welfare functions based on the results of setwise
contests are worth investigating in our opinion, both from the axiomatic and the computational
points of view.
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A Deferred Proofs of Section 2
Proposition 2. The function δkKT has all the properties of a distance: non-negativity, identity of
indiscernibles, symmetry and triangle inequality.
Proof. Non-negativity and symmetry are obvious from the definition of δkKT. It also verifies identity
of indiscernibles: if δkKT(r, r
′)=0, then rankings r and r′ must in particular agree on each pairwise
comparison, hence δKT(r, r
′) = 0 and r= r′ because δKT verifies identity of indiscernibles. Lastly,
triangular inequality comes from the fact that given three rankings r1, r2 and r3 and a set S,
1tr1 (S)6=tr3 (S)
≤ 1tr1 (S)6=tr2 (S) + 1tr2 (S)6=tr3 (S).
Proposition 3. Given two rankings r and r′, δkKT(r, r
′) can be computed in O(m3) by using the
following formula:
δkKT(r, r
′) =
∑
{c,c′}⊆C
1c≻rc′1c′≻r′c
k−2∑
i=0
(|Bc(r) ∩Bc′(r′)|
i
)
where Bc(r) = {x ∈ C s.t. c ≻r x}.
Proof. We prove the O(m3) complexity of the method. First note that the computation of all
binomial coefficients
(
p
i
)
for i ∈ {0, . . . , k−2} and p ∈ {i, . . . ,m−2} can be performed in O(mk)
thanks to Pascal’s formula
(
p
i
)
+
(
p
i+1
)
=
(
p+1
i+1
)
. Then the computation of the sums
∑k−2
i=0
(
p
i
)
for p ∈ {0, . . . ,m−2} can also be computed in O(mk). For each pair {c, c′} of candidates, the
computation of |Bc(r) ∩ Bc′(r′)| can be performed in O(m). As there are O(m2) such pairs, the
overall complexity of the method is O(m3 +mk) = O(m3).
B Comparison between the k-wise Kendall tau distance and the
position weighted Kendall tau distance
We relate here the k-wise Kemeny rule to another extension of the Kemeny rule that was in-
troduced by Kumar and Vassilvistkii 2010. They proposed that disagreements on highly ranked
candidates be more costly than disagreements on lowly ranked ones. To achieve this, they defined
a position-weighted version of Kendall tau, denoted by δwKT, where an inversion of the two candi-
dates at positions i and i− 1 has a cost wi. For convenience, a cost w1 = 1 is also defined. Given
the costs wi, one can then measure the average swap-cost of moving a candidate from position i
to j by computing the ratio
pi−pj
i−j where pi =
∑i
j=1wj . This observation motivated the following
definition for a position-weighted version of Kendall tau (Kumar and Vassilvitskii, 2010):
δwKT(r, r
′) =
∑
{c,c′}⊆C
1c≻rc′1c′≻r′c
p(r, r′, c)p(r, r′, c′)
where p(r, r′, c) =
prk(c,r) − prk(c,r′)
rk(c, r)− rk(c, r′)
Stated otherwise, if two rankings r and r′ disagree on a pairwise comparison between two can-
didates c and c′, then the cost of this disagreement is weighted by the product of the average
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swap-cost of moving c from its position in r to its position in r′ with the average swap-cost of
moving c′ from its position in r to its position in r′. Note that if wi = 1 for all i in {1, . . . ,m},
one obtains the usual Kendall tau distance.
Both the position-weighted Kendall tau distance and the k-wise Kendall tau distance can
be used in order to penalize more strongly disagreements on candidates with high ranks (i.e.,
candidates that appear near the top of the ranking). For the k-wise Kendall tau distance, this
property results from the fact that for a pair {c, c′} such that tr({c, c′}) 6= tr′({c, c′}) the number
of resulting subsets S for which tr(S) 6= tr′(S) is all the larger as c and c′ are ranked high in r and
r′. Note however that the position-weighted Kendall tau distance requires to specify the m − 1
parameters w2, . . . , wm, the tuning of which does not seem to be obvious. In comparison, the
k-wise Kendall tau distance only requires to choose the value of k, from which the cost of each
disagreement on a pair {c, c′} of candidates is naturally entailed: it corresponds to the number of
subsets of C of size less than or equal to k for which the top choice in r is c while the top choice in
r′ is c′ (see Section 2 for the formal expression of swap-costs according to k). We now prove that
the k-wise Kendall tau distance is not equivalent to any position-weighted Kendall tau distance
if k ≥ 3.
Proposition 4. The k-wise Kendall tau distance is not equivalent to any position-weighted Kendall
tau distance if k ≥ 3.
Proof. We consider an election with 3 candidates, i.e., C = {c1, c2, c3}. Note that as there are only
three candidates, each k-wise Kendall tau distance with k ≥ 3 is equivalent to the 3-wise Kendall
tau distance. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists weights w2 and w3
such that for any rankings r and r′ in R(C), we have δwKT(r, r′) = δ3KT(r, r′). For r = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3
and r′ = c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c3 this leads to w2 =
√
2. If r = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 and r′ = c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 this leads
to w3 = 1. Lastly, with r = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 and r′ = c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c2, we obtain:
δwKT(r, r
′) =
1 +
√
2
2
√
2 +
1 +
√
2
2
≈ 2.91 6= 3 = δ3KT(r, r′)
which yields the desired contradiction.
C Deferred Proofs of Section 3
Proposition 5. The k-wise Kemeny rule satisfies monotonicity.
Proof. Let r be a ranking and v be a voter such that c and c′ are consecutive in rv and c
′ ≻rv c.
Let us denote by rc↔c
′
v the ranking obtained from rv by switching the positions of c and c
′.
Then, the sets S for which trv(S) 6= trc↔c′v (S) are of the form {c, c
′} ∪ S′ where S′ ⊆ Bc(rv).
Furthermore, if such a set S contains a candidate c′′ such that c′′ ≻r tr({c, c′}), then we will
both have tr(S) 6= trv(S) and tr(S) 6= trc↔c′v (S). Hence, the sets which account for the difference
between δkKT(r, rv) and δ
k
KT(r, r
c↔c′
v ) are of the form {c, c′} ∪ S′ where S′ ⊆ Bc(rv) ∩Btr({c,c′})(r).
More precisely, using Equation 1, we obtain that δkKT(r, r
c↔c′
v ) is equal to:
• δkKT(r, rv)−
∑k−2
i=0
(|Bc′(rv)∩Bc(r)|
i
)
if c ≻r c′;
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• δkKT(r, rv) +
∑k−2
i=0
(|Bc(rv)∩Bc′ (r)|
i
)
if c′ ≻r c.
Hence, δkKT(r, rv) will decrease if r ranks c before c
′ and the decrease is maximal when c is ranked
first in r (because it maximizes |Bc′(rv)∩Bc(r)|). Repeating this argument shows that no winner
is harmed by up-ranking. Similarly, δkKT(r, rv) will increase if r ranks c
′ before c and the increase
is maximal when c′ is ranked first in r (because it maximizes |Bc(rv) ∩ Bc′(r)|). Repeating this
argument shows that no loser can win by down-ranking.
Proposition 6. The k-wise Kemeny rule satisfies unanimity.
Proof. Let c, c′ ∈ C be two candidates and P be a preference profile such that for all ranking r′′
in P , c ≻r′′ c′. Let r be a ranking such that c′ ≻r c, and r′ be the ranking obtained from r by
exchanging the positions of c′ and c. Moreover, let K denote the set of candidates between c and
c′ in r. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that r minimizes δkKT(·,P). We will prove that
for any r′′ ∈ P, δkKT(r′, r′′) < δkKT(r, r′′). Let r′′ ∈ P and S ⊆ C such that tr′(S) 6= tr′′(S) and
tr(S) = tr′′(S). Then S must contain either c or c
′, and does not contain any element ranked
higher than c′ in r because otherwise we would have tr(S) = tr′(S). This implies that either
tr′(S) = c (if c ∈ S) or tr(S) = c′ (if c′ ∈ S). These situations are exclusive: there cannot be both
c and c′ in S as we cannot have tr′′(S) = c
′ if c ∈ S. To sum up, there are two possibilities:
1. tr′(S) = c and tr′′(S) = tr(S) = c
′′ is in K. This implies that c′′ is the second choice of
r′ in S and that c′′ ≻r′′ c′ as c′′ ≻r′′ c. In this case, necessarily, c′ 6∈ S and we consider
S′ = (S \ {c}) ∪ {c′}.
2. tr′(S) ∈ K and tr′′(S) = tr(S) = c′. In this case, necessarily, c 6∈ S and we consider
S′ = S ∪ {c}.
In both cases, we obtain a set S′ such that tr′(S
′) = tr′′(S
′) and tr(S
′) 6= tr′′(S′). Note that
any set S will induce a different S′ and that {c, c′} is not one of these sets S′. As we also
have tr′({c, c′}) = tr′′({c, c′}) and tr({c, c′}) 6= tr′′({c, c′}), this proves that for any r′′ ∈ P,
δkKT(r
′, r′′) < δkKT(r, r
′′) and hence the claim.
To prove Theorem 1, we first state two lemmata.
Lemma 1. If the candidates in a set S ⊆ C are ranked in the |S| last positions by every voters
and in the same order, then for any k ≥ 2, any consensus ranking w.r.t. the k-wise Kemeny rule
has the same property.
Proof. This is a simple consequence of the unanimity property that is satisfied by the k-wise
Kemeny rule.
Lemma 2. For any p ∈ N∗ and ε ∈ (0, 12p) we have the following inequality:
(1 + ε)p < 1 + 2pε
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Proof. We prove the claim by induction. It is obvious for p=1. Consider the claim true for p=k,
then for ε ∈ (0, 12(k+1))
(1+ε)k+1=(1 + ε)(1+ε)k <(1+ε)(1+2kε)
=1+2kε+ε+2kε2 <1+2(k + 1)ε
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis and the second inequality uses the fact
that 2kε2<ε because 2kε<1 for ε∈(0, 12(k+1)).
We can now prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. For any constant k ≥ 3, k-KAP is NP-hard, even if the number of voters equals
4 or if the average range of candidates equals 2 (where the range of a candidate c is defined by
maxr∈P rk(c, r)−minr∈P rk(c, r) + 1 and the average is taken over all candidates).
Proof. We obtain our hardness result via a reduction from the standard Kemeny aggregation
problem (2-KAP), which is known to be NP-hard (Bartholdi et al., 1989). Consider a preference
profile P with n ≥ 1 voters and m ≥ k ≥ 3 candidates. Note that we can assume m ≥ k as k
is a constant and 2-KAP is fixed parameter tractable w.r.t. m (Betzler et al., 2009). We add to
the problem λ = 4nm4 candidates c∗1, . . . , c
∗
λ that are ranked last by all voters and in the same
order, i.e., c∗1 ≻r . . . ≻r c∗λ for all r in P . We denote the resulting set of candidates by C ′ (i.e.,
C ′ = C ∪ {c∗1, . . . , c∗λ}) and the resulting preference profile by P ′. By using Lemma 1, we will
restrict our attention to rankings that rank these additional voters last and in the same order as
the voters, because they are the only possible consensus rankings.
Given two such rankings r and r′, we have by Equation 1 that δkKT(r, r
′) is equal to:
∑
{c,c′}⊆C′
1c≻rc′1c′≻r′c
k−2∑
i=0
(|Bc(rC) ∩Bc′(r′C)|+ λ
i
)
=
∑
{c,c′}⊆C
1c≻rc′1c′≻r′c
(
1+
k−2∑
i=1
(|Bc(rC) ∩Bc′(r′C)|+ λ
i
))
because there is no disagreement for {c, c′} 6⊆ C and (|Bc(rC)∩Bc′ (r′C)|+λ
0
)
=1.
From 0 ≤ |Bc(rC) ∩Bc′(r′C)| < m, we deduce:
k−2∑
i=1
(
λ
i
)
≤
k−2∑
i=1
(|Bc(rC) ∩Bc′(r′C)|+ λ
i
)
<
k−2∑
i=1
(
m+ λ
i
)
.
Consequently:
δKT(rC , r
′
C)
(
1 +
k−2∑
i=1
(
λ
i
))
≤ δkKT(r, r′) < δKT(rC , r′C)
(
1 +
k−2∑
i=1
(
m+ λ
i
))
20
because
∑
{c,c′}⊆C 1c≻rc′1c′≻r′c
= δKT(rC , r
′
C); from which we obtain:
δKT(rC ,P)
(
1 +
k−2∑
i=1
(
λ
i
))
≤ δkKT(r,P ′) < δKT(rC ,P)
(
1 +
k−2∑
i=1
(
m+ λ
i
))
(5)
because
∑
r′∈P ′ δKT(rC , r
′
C)=δKT(rC ,P) and
∑
r′∈P ′ δ
k
KT(r, r
′)=δkKT(r,P ′), provided that tailλ(r)=
c∗1≻r . . .≻r c∗λ and tailλ(r′)=c∗1≻r′ . . .≻r′ c∗λ ∀r′∈P ′.
Now, note that:
(
m+ λ
i
)
=
λ!
i!(λ− i)!
∏m
j=1(λ+ j)∏m
j=1(λ− i+ j)
=
(
λ
i
) m∏
j=1
λ+ j
λ+ j − i (6)
If one sets λ=4nm4, the following inequalities hold:
4nm4 + j
4nm4 + j − i = 1 +
i
4nm4 + j − i ≤ 1 +
i
4nm4 − i
≤ 1 + 2i
4nm4
≤ 1 + 1
2nm3
where the second inequality follows from 4nm4/(4nm4 − i) ≤ 2 for i ∈ J1,mK.
From Equation 6, we deduce then:(
m+ 4nm4
i
)
≤
(
4nm4
i
)
(1 +
1
2nm3
)m ≤
(
4nm4
i
)
(1 +
1
nm2
)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2 with ε= 1
2nm3
because 1
2nm3
< 12m for m≥3.
Coming back to Equation 5, this implies:
δKT(rC ,P) ≤ δ
k
KT(r,P ′)
1 +
∑k−2
i=1
(4nm4
i
) < δKT(rC ,P) + 1
nm2
δKT(rC ,P)
and therefore:
δKT(rC ,P) ≤ δ
k
KT(r,P ′)
1 +
∑k−2
i=1
(4nm4
i
) < δKT(rC ,P) + 1
because δKT(rC ,P) ≤ n
(
m
2
) ≤ nm2.
Our hardness claim is due to the fact that a ranking r∗ minimizing δkKT(r,P ′) must be such
that r∗C minimizes δKT(rC ,P). Indeed, assume r∗C does not minimize δKT(rC ,P) and consider rˆ so
that rˆC does, then δ
k
KT(rˆ,P ′)<δkKT(r∗,P ′) as:
δkKT(rˆ,P ′)
1 +
∑k−2
i=1
(4nm4
i
) < δKT(rˆC ,P) + 1 ≤ δKT(r∗C ,P) ≤ δkKT(r∗,P ′)
1 +
∑k−2
i=1
(4nm4
i
) .
a contradiction.
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It is known that 2-KAP is NP-hard even if the number n of voters equals 4 (Dwork et al.,
2001) and even if the average range of candidates equals 2 (Betzler et al., 2009). As the reduction
above preserves the number of voters and decreases the average range of candidates, the same
results hold for k-KAP.
Observation 1. There exists instances with arbitrary large sets of candidates such that the
k-wise Kemeny rule differs from the Kemeny rule.
Proof. Consider the election described in Example 1, then the only k-wise Kemeny consensus
ranking is c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3, while the only pairwise Kemeny consensus ranking is c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1. Now
we modify the preference profile of the previous election by adding candidates c4 to ck, with k
arbitrarily large such that for any ranking r in the new preference profile, headk−3(r) = ck ≻
ck−1 ≻ . . . ≻ c4. With this new preference profile, the only k-wise Kemeny consensus ranking
is ck ≻ ck−1 ≻ . . . ≻ c4 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3, while the only pairwise Kemeny consensus ranking is
ck ≻ ck−1 ≻ . . . ≻ c4 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1.
D Deferred Proofs of Section 4
Theorem 3. Let P be a profile over C and assume that the SCCs of GkP are numbered according
to a linear order <Gk
P
∈O(GkP). Among the rankings consistent with <GkP , there exists a consensus
ranking w.r.t. the k-wise Kemeny rule. Besides, if O(GkP )={<Gk
P
} and minS∈∆m
cc′
wkP (S, c, c
′)>04
for all c∈Bi(GkP) and c′ ∈Bj(GkP ) when i <GkP j, then all consensus rankings are consistent with
<Gk
P
.
Proof. Assume that the SCCs of GkP are numbered according to a linear order <Gk
P
∈O(GkP) and
consider a ranking r which is not consistent with <Gk
P
. Hence, there exists a pair (c, c′) such that
c directly follows c′ in r while c ∈ Bi(GkP) and c′ ∈ Bj(GkP) with i < j. Since i < j, there is no
arc from c′ to c in GkP (i.e., ∀S ∈∆mcc′ , wkP(S, c, c′)≥ 0). Let S be the set composed of c′ and all
candidates placed after c′ in r, including c. Then the ranking rc↔c
′
obtained from r by exchanging
the positions of c and c′ verifies δkKT(r
c↔c′,P)=δkKT(r,P)−wkP(S, c, c′) ≤ δkKT(r,P). The repetition of
this argument concludes the proof of the first claim. The second claim is proved similarly because,
in this case, δkKT(r
c↔c′,P)=δkKT(r,P)−wkP(S, c, c′)<δkKT(r).
Theorem 4. Given a profile P and two candidates c and c′, determining if maxS∈∆m
cc′
wkP (S, c, c
′) >
0 is NP-hard for k ≥ 4.
Proof. We make a reduction from the set cover problem. Given a set of elements X = {x1, . . . , xp}
and a collection of sets of elements of X , T = {T1, . . . , Tq}, we need to determine if there exists
a subcollection K ⊆ T of at most b sets that covers X . We assume that no set in T contains X
as otherwise the problem is trivial. Furthermore, we assume that no element in X is contained in
all sets of T as otherwise this element could be discarded from the instance as any solution would
4Or, equivalently, maxS∈∆m
cc
′
wkP(S, c
′, c)<0.
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cover this element. We now detail the preference profile that we create from an instance of the
set cover problem.
Set of candidates: We will create a profile such that maxS∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′) > 0 iff the answer
to the set cover problem is yes for the instance under consideration. More precisely, we will show
that if X cannot be covered by a subcollection K ⊆ T with less than b sets, then wkP(S, c, c′) < 0
for all S in ∆mcc′ . Otherwise, if set X can be covered with a subcollection K ⊆ T with less than b
sets, then there exists a set S in ∆mcc′ such that w
k
P(S, c, c
′) > 0. In addition to candidates c and
c′, for each pair (i, t) such that xi ∈ Tt we create a candidate cit. Moreover, for each set Tt we
create a candidate ct. In the sequel, we may call candidates cit element candidates and candidates
ct set candidates. This process yields at most pq+2 candidates ((p− 1)q+ q+2). The candidates
cit and ct will make the correspondence with the subcollection K: the candidate ct will be in the
set S iff Tt ∈ K and the candidate cit will be in the set S if Tt is added to K in order to cover xi.
Set of voters: For each pair (i, t) such that xi ∈ Tt, we create 2b voters vsit (s ∈ {1, . . . , 2b})
with the same ranking rit such that tail4(rit) = c ≻ cit ≻ ct ≻ c′. For each element xi ∈ X ,
we create 2b voters vsi (s ∈ {1, . . . , 2b}) with the same ranking ri such that tailu+2(ri) = c′ ≻
cit1 ≻ . . . ≻ citu ≻ c where Tt1 , Tt2 , . . . , Ttu are the different sets that contain xi. For each set
Tt we create 2b|Tt| + 2 voters vst (s ∈ {1, . . . , 2b|Tt| + 2}) with the same ranking rt such that
tail3(rt) = c
′ ≻ ct ≻ c. Lastly, we create 2q +1+ 2b voters vs (s ∈ {1, . . . , 2q +1+ 2b}) with the
same ranking r such that tail2(r) = c ≻ c′. In the end, we obtain O(bpq) voters. Note that P
can be build with no unanimity dominance relationship between two candidates.
We now show that, given k ≥ 4, we have maxS∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′) > 0 iff the answer to the set
cover problem is yes.
First note that when S = {c, c′}, we have the following values for φkP(S, c, c′) and φkP(S, c′, c):
φkP ({c, c′}, c, c′) = 2b
q∑
i=1
|Ti|+ 2q + 2b+ 1
φkP ({c, c′}, c′, c) = 2b
q∑
i=1
|Ti|+ 2q + 2bp
Hence,
wkP({c, c′}, c, c′) = φkP({c, c′}, c, c′)− φkP({c, c′}, c′, c)
= 2b(1− p) + 1 < 0,
as p ≥ 2 and b ≥ 1.
Now let us look at how adding an element to S starting from S = {c, c′} modifies values
φkP(S, c, c
′) and φkP(S, c
′, c). We will assume without loss of generality that we add set candidates
before element candidates.
• If we assume S is only composed of c, c′ and set candidates, then adding a candidate ct to
it results in adding 2b|Tt| to φkP (S, c, c′) and 2b|Tt|+ 2 to φkP(S, c′, c).
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• If we add a candidate cit to S, then we add 2b to φkP (S, c, c′) if ct 6∈ S and 4b otherwise.
Additionally, we add 2b to φkP(S, c
′, c) if there is no other cit′ ∈ S, otherwise we add to it
something that is greater than or equal to 4b. Note that we have used the fact that k ≥ 4,
as we would only add 2b to both values if k was equal to 3.
From these observations, we can derive the following rules:
1. If {cit, cit′} ⊂ S with t 6= t′, then wkP(S, c, c′) ≤ wkP(S \ {cit′}, c, c′).
2. If cit ∈ S and ct 6∈ S, then wkP(S, c, c′) ≤ wkP(S \ {cit}, c, c′).
3. If ct ∈ S and ∀xi ∈ St, cit 6∈ S, then wkP(S, c, c′) ≤ wkP(S \ {ct}, c, c′).
Stated differently, while rule 1 states that, to maximize wkP(S, c, c
′), we should keep no more than
one candidate cit per element xi, rules 2 and 3 state that there should be a candidate cit in S iff
there should also be candidate ct.
Let us now consider a set S ∈ ∆mcc′ verifying rules 1, 2 and 3 that includes one candidate cit
for s elements {xi1 , . . . , xis} and v set candidates. Then:
wkP(S, c, c
′) = 2b(1− p) + 1− 2v + 2bs
= 2b(s− p) + 2(b− v) + 1
Note that if S 6= {c, c′}, then v ≥ 1 and that by rule 1, s ≤ p. If s < p, then wkP(S, c, c′) ≤
−2b+ 2(b− v) + 1 = 1− 2v < 0. Hence, if wkP(S, c, c′) ≥ 0 then s = p, which further implies that
v ≤ b. In this case, it is easy to see that the v sets corresponding to the set candidates in S form
a valid set cover of X as {xi1 , . . . , xis} = X , v ≤ b and S verifies rule 2. To summarize, making
the assumption that wkP(S, c, c
′) ≥ 0, we have showed that we could build a valid set cover of X
from S. Consequently, this implies that if the set cover instance admits no valid set cover, then
maxS∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′) < 0.
Conversely, let us assume that there exists a subcollection {Ti1 , . . . , Tiv} with v ≤ b sets that
covers X . We consider a set S such that {ci1 , . . . , civ , c, c′} ⊂ S and such that for each xi ∈ X , S
contains exactly one candidate cit where xi ∈ Tt and t ∈ I := {i1, . . . , iv}. Then, simple calcula
show that:
φkP(S, c, c
′) = 2b
q∑
i=1
|Ti|+ 2b
∑
j∈I
|Tj |+ 4bp + 2q + 1 + 2b,
φkP(S, c
′, c) = 4bp+ 2b
q∑
i=1
|Ti|+ 2q + 2b
∑
j∈I
|Tj |+ 2v.
Hence, wkP (S, c, c
′) ≥ 1 and maxS∈∆m
cc′
wkP(S, c, c
′) > 0.
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